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In reality, the corporate behavior may be more shaped and determinated by 
social norms like reputation than by legal rules (Coffee, 2001a). As an informally 
institutional constraint, reputation mechanism is often mentioned in the classic 
literatures of corporate governance. However, most literatures analyze the reputation 
mechanism from the perspective of normative research, but do not provide 
systematically empirical and available evidence in corporate governance.  
In transition countries like China, reputation mechanism could play a role in the 
stock market? How about the effect of reputation mechanism in corporate governance? 
Based on prior researches, this paper systematically and comprehensively studies on 
the corporate governance role of reputation mechanism in Chinese listed companies. 
And the contributions of this paper develop and enrich the theoretical literatures on 
the extra-legal corporate governance institution. 
This paper empirically studies the effect of reputation mechanism in corporate 
governance from three aspects. And it is divided into six chapters. 
Chapter 1 briefly introduces the questions, contents, and framework, as well as 
the contributions and innovations to research in this area. 
Chapter 2 systematically and roundly reviews existing academic literatures about 
reputation mechanism. 
As a basic test, chapter 3 examines the relationship between reputation 
mechanism and shareholder value, reputation mechanism and government regulation, 
firm characteristics, and market factors. Besides that, we also investigate the 
relationship between reputation mechanism and financing opportunties. 
As a key test, chapter 4 examines the relationship between reputation mechanism 
and management turnover, reputation mechanism and opportunities that senior 
managers remain other positions in the companies. 
As a central test, chapter 5 examines the relationship between reputation 

















directors in board. And Chapter 5 also studies that reputation mechanism takes effect 
on the supervision of independent directors. 
Chapter 6 concludies this paper and points out the limitations and future 
research. 
The conclusions of this paper are as follows: 
Firstly, the listed companies which violated laws and government rules can lead 
to significant loss of shareholder value. In addition, effective government regulation 
can contribute to reduce the degree of market information asymmetry, and improve 
the function of the reputation mechanism. The findings show that, even in the absence 
of perfect legal system and market rules, reputation mechanism also can take effect in 
Chinese stock market and there are complementary relationship between the 
reputation mechanism and government regulation. 
Secondly, reputation mechanism not only has a significant effect on the 
management turnover, but also can reduce the probability that the chairmen remain 
other positions in the companies. The findings show that reputation mechanism can 
effectively restrict chairmen and CEO in companies, and improve corporate 
governance. 
Thirdly, reputation mechanism can change the structure of board. In order to 
rebuild reputation, the sample companies increase the proportion of independent 
directors to strengthen the supervisory function. Besides that, under the influence of 
the reputation mechanism, independent directors of board also more diligently 
perform supervisory function than before in the companies. 
The potential contributions and innovations of this paper are as follows: 
Firstly, this paper completely and systematically studies the role of reputation 
mechanism in corporate governance and provides robust empirical evidence, which 
not only forms the foundation for the future research, but also enriches the research on 
the extra-legal corporate governance institution in China. Besides taht, I think that 
reputation mechanism can play role in corporate governance based on financing 
opportunities other than manager market.  

















largely determine the self-implementation cost of reputation mechanism. So 
improving the effectiveness of government regulation and the efficiency of the 
exchange of information will contribute to the effect of reputation mechanism, but 
excessive government regulation will limit the function of reputation mechanism. The 
conclusion has a certain reference value for government to make policy. 
Thirdly, based on the prior researches, this paper improves the empirical design 
and distinguishs the effect between corporate performance and reputation mechanism 
on the management turnover, which provides more accurate empirical evidence. 
The main limitations of this paper are as follows: 
On the one hand, the empirical evidence about relationship between reputation 
mechanism and financing costs or financing opportunities in the future will help 
complement and enhance the robustness of the conclusions. On the other hand, the 
selected data limit the research, so that we couldn’t examine the incentive function of 
reputation mechanism in corporate governance. In addition, reputation metrics index 
also limits the methods of this study. We couldn’t observe the different reputation 
between the different subjects from more micro level, but also the impact of 
quantitative changes of reputation in corporate governance. 
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第一节  研究背景和问题的提出 






德风险的关注，使公司治理在 20 世纪 80 年代逐渐成为理论研究的热点。这一时
期人们对公司治理问题的关注集中于管理者的机会主义行为对股东利益的偏离，
并试图通过建立完善的内部治理机制（Weisbach，1988；Jensen 和 Murphy，1990a）
和外部治理机制（Jensen 和 Rebuck，1983；Fama 和 Jensen，1983）解决管理者
的代理问题。到 20 世纪 90 年代中后期，公司治理的研究思路和研究路径发生了














































①以 La Port et al.（1997，1998，1999，2000，2002）、Levine（1999）、Demirguc-Kun 和 Makimovic（1998）、













































②Stulz 和 Williamson （2003）以文化因素解释了国家之间投资者保护存在差异的原因，Licht et al.（2005）、
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